What to Do about Iraq, III

“Third: Recognize that the main ‘benefits of success’ are not specific or tangible.  The United States went to war in Iraq not to seize territory, oil, or military bases, but to end the threat the Iraq regime posed to the region, the United States, and the world.  If this fundamental goal is achieved–if that regime is replaced with a reasonably stable government that poses no such threats–it would make the United States safer and improve international security.  Above and beyond this, if Iraq should one day build stable democratic institutions, it might spur political reform in the Muslim world–an even more valuable accomplishment that could help curtail the appeal of Islamist extremism.  Success in Iraq would also demonstrate that the United States is capable of persevering in a costly effort to defend its interests.  This would increase American credibility, making it easier in the future to win cooperation from other countries.

But the largest benefit of success is avoiding the horrific costs of failure.  Preventing calamaties is one of the most important and least appreciated functions of government.  When an evil is averted–perhaps as a result of insight, intensive effort, and administrative skill–the result is that nothing happens.  It is easy, after the fact, for critics to ignore or deprecate the accomplishment.” – Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.523.

A New Phenomenon

“The 9/11 attack was a new phenomenon, and not just because it hit Americans on American soil.  It was not an act of political theater; rather, it was the first successful case of terrorism of mass destruction.  Though the al Qaida hijackers killed only–only!–around three thousand people, one had to assume that the terrorists would have been glad to kill all thirty thousand people who worked at the World Trade Center, and even multiples of that number. 

This was why keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists became, suddenly and inevitably, a far more pressing and higher-order concern than it had before.  It concentrated the minds of U.S. officials on the threat from states that both coveted WMD and supported terrorists.

Iraq was such a state.  Its singular history of aggression, and its defiance of the world’s many efforts to constrain it, made Iraq stand out even among such other WMD-coveting, terrorist-supporting states as Iran and North Korea.” – Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.214.

What to Do about Iraq, II

“Second: Calculate the costs and benefits of pursuing the war in Iraq by looking forward, not backward.  Critics of the war continually attack the Administration for past acts and omissions–for how the war was ’sold’ or planned or run.  Those are important issues, but the current policy question is whether continuing to fight is worth the effort–whether securing the benefits of success, and avoiding the consequences of failure, will be worth the costs yet unpaid.” – Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.523.

What to Do about Iraq Now, I

Prof. Douglas Feith, one of the planners of the Iraq war, deals with this issue in four points.  Here is the first.  
“First: Formulate a realistic goal–that is, a reasonable definition of success.  The achievement of stable democracy is not a sensible goal, because it is not likely to be accomplished in the near term.  It may be possible fairly soon, however, for Iraq to reach the point where, despite the inevitable ongoing problems of building a new society, its government can manage its own affairs with only a limited amount of outside help.  That is a realistic goal.” — Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.522.

Five Strategic Thoughts of the Bush Administration

“The Bush Administration’s response to 9/11 was different from that of any previous U.S. administration to a terrorist attack.  It was based on five major thoughts:

First, the foremost purpose of the U.S. response to the attack was not punishment or retaliation but preventing the next attack–a point that argued for quick action to disrupt ongoing terrorist plans.

Second, we were at war with a global terrorist network of Islamist extremist groups, including state and nonstate sponsors–and the next attack might come not from al Qaida but from some other part of the movement.  Our strategy has to target both those groups themselves and their key sources of actual and potential support–operational, logistic, financial, and ideological.

Third, our attackers were bent not on political theater but on mass destruction.  This highlighted the possibility that terrorists might obtain chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to maximize the death toll.

Fourth, a series of 9/11-type terrorist attacks on the United States could change the nature of our country.  Our national security policy extends beyond simply protecting people or territory.  It includes securing our consitutional system, our civil liberties, and the open nature of our society–’our way of life,’ as President Bush expressed it.

This war aim brought us to the fifth strategic thought: In order to counter this threat successfully, we could not rely on a defensive strategy alone.  The United States has so many rich targets that it would demand extraordinary measures to secure them individually–and the effort to do so would endanger our free and open society.  These considerations necessitated a strategy of initiative and offense–of disrupting the terrorist network abroad.

Taken as a wole, these five thoughts drove the Bush Administration to a strategy that gave weight not just to al Qaida but to terrorists of various stripes–such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was merely an al Qaida ‘associate’ at the time, and to groups such as Ansar al-Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah, which had trained with al Qaida in Afghanistan, and Hezbollah.” – Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.507.

A Poor Job Explaining Itself

“One sign of the poor job the [Bush] Administration has done in describing and explaining its actions is that the public debate on Iraq reflects little understanding of the Administration’s actual rationale for overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime.  Many believe the war was based solely on the erroneous information about chemical and biological weapons stockpiles.  Some maintain, against all logic and evidence, that the war was fought to gain Iraq’s oil–as if the U.S. had expected to take money out of Iraq instead of putting billions into the war and reconstruction effort.

Above all, there is little awareness of how Iraq fit into the broader strategy against terrorism.  Given Saddam’s role as an important problem for the United States–since his rape of Kuwait in 1990–it was clear that Iraq, along with other state supporters of terrorism, would have to be addressed within a comprehensive strategy for the war on terrorism.” — Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.514.

Why Overthrow Saddam?

“Why did President Bush decide to overthrow Saddam Hussein?  In short, it was to end a range of threats.  No other contemporary leader–and a few in history–had a record of aggression to match Saddam’s.  He had started major wars of conquest.  He had brutalized his citizens and killed them in enormous numbers.  He had given aid and support to terrorists.  And, in violation of treaty obligations, he had not only pursued mass-destruction weapons, but used them, on his foreign enemies and on his own citizens. 

The problem of Saddam Hussein predated 9/11.  It had become a principle U.S. preoccupation when he seized Kuwait in 1990.  Saddam survived the Gulf War, and Iraq remained a danger throughout the 1990s–one the UN Security Council had tried to contain by imposing economic sanction and weapons inspections.  In August 1998 Saddam generated a crisis by shutting down the UN weapons inspections.  Two months later, the U.S. Congress–concerned that the Iraqi hreat was growing, while the world’s resolve to ‘contain’ Saddam was weakening–passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which called for regime change in Baghdad: 

‘It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.‘“ – Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.181-182.

Liberty Within Their Own Culture

“I hope the good people of Iraq will remember our history, and not pay attenton to the hateful propaganda of their government.  America has never sought to dominate, has never sought to conquer.  We’ve always sought to liberate and to free.  Our desire is to help Iraqi citizens find the blessings of liberty within their own culture and their own traditions.  The Iraqi people cannot flourish under a dictator that oppresses them and threatens them.  Gifted people of Iraq will flourish if and when oppression is lifted.” — Pres. George W. Bush, President Signs Iraqi Resolution, 2002.

“Beyond the War on Terror”

“America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values [rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; religious tolerance] around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment.  We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.” — Pres. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002.

 

“Non-Negotiable Demands”

“We have no intention of imposing our culture.  But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.” — Pres. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002.