“The Bush Administration’s response to 9/11 was different from that of any previous U.S. administration to a terrorist attack. It was based on five major thoughts:
First, the foremost purpose of the U.S. response to the attack was not punishment or retaliation but preventing the next attack–a point that argued for quick action to disrupt ongoing terrorist plans.
Second, we were at war with a global terrorist network of Islamist extremist groups, including state and nonstate sponsors–and the next attack might come not from al Qaida but from some other part of the movement. Our strategy has to target both those groups themselves and their key sources of actual and potential support–operational, logistic, financial, and ideological.
Third, our attackers were bent not on political theater but on mass destruction. This highlighted the possibility that terrorists might obtain chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to maximize the death toll.
Fourth, a series of 9/11-type terrorist attacks on the United States could change the nature of our country. Our national security policy extends beyond simply protecting people or territory. It includes securing our consitutional system, our civil liberties, and the open nature of our society–‘our way of life,’ as President Bush expressed it.
This war aim brought us to the fifth strategic thought: In order to counter this threat successfully, we could not rely on a defensive strategy alone. The United States has so many rich targets that it would demand extraordinary measures to secure them individually–and the effort to do so would endanger our free and open society. These considerations necessitated a strategy of initiative and offense–of disrupting the terrorist network abroad.
Taken as a wole, these five thoughts drove the Bush Administration to a strategy that gave weight not just to al Qaida but to terrorists of various stripes–such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was merely an al Qaida ‘associate’ at the time, and to groups such as Ansar al-Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah, which had trained with al Qaida in Afghanistan, and Hezbollah.” — Douglas Feith, War and Decision, p.507.